The Bank introduced the London Approach, an informal set of guidelines on how to prevent multi-banker companies from going bust, in reaction to the spiralling numbers of banks involved in restructuring talks. Where companies had previously used a handful of lead banks, by the 1980s companies like Polly Peck and the Maxwell empire were borrowing from hundreds of banks from all over the world. This made co-ordinating refinancing talks increasingly difficult. Under the London Approach a single lead bank would be appointed, usually a UK clearing bank, to liaise with all the overseas banks and work with insolvency specialists towards a rescue. The Bank of England would use its clout to bring recalcitrant banks into line.Colin Bird, head of corporate recovery at Price Waterhouse, now wants a new London Approach that will incorporate the interests of two other groups that can potentially destabilise international rescue attempts - bond-holders and debt-traders.Both groups often have completely different agendas from the banks. Some debt-traders in the US are called "vulture funds" because they buy up debt in troubled companies on the cheap and then attempt to make a turn by influencing the rescue talks to their own ends.Mr Bird said: "Two opportunities exist. First, to create an approach that works for all stakeholder groups and which makes reconstruction possible. Secondly, to make London the place to undertake international rescues and restructures."Chris Barlow, a senior insolvency partner with Coopers & Lybrand, and the man winding up Polly Peck, agrees that the emergence of aggressive American debt-traders means a new approach is needed which will involve them in the rescue process.Mr Barlow said: "The London Approach has worked very well so far.

There have been over 40 successful work-outs of companies with debts of over pounds 100m in the last six years. Companies like Stakis Hotels, Tiphook, Gateway and Queens Moat Houses were all dealt with using the approach."Mr Bird intends to press his proposals for a new approach at a conference for international insolvency specialists in New Orleans this March.. It has been quite a week for football. Millwall called in the administrators, Bournemouth went into receivership, Rangers received a pounds 40m cash injection from billionaire tax exile Joe Lewis while PizzaExpress entrepreneur Peter Boizot bought Peterborough. Football, as never before, is stealing the headlines on the business pages. Even more worryingly, according to ShareLink five of last week's top 10 most heavily bought shares were football clubs, including Millwall. Even Alan Hansen, one of the most respected commentators on activities on the pitch, has put his name to a football investment fund run by Singer & Friedlander.

If ever there were a sign that a bull market was ready to boil over surely it is this. As with all investment stories at the height of market booms, there is more than a grain of truth in the apparent attractions of football and over the past year shares in the growing number of quoted football clubs have outperformed the rest of the market by a stunning margin. The trouble is, football's dazzling run so far does not mean it will continue to be such a great investment.The bull case for football rests on a number of pretty compelling arguments. The game has been transformed since the Taylor report of 1990 was published, with far-reaching implications for safety standards, communication between clubs and fans and the behaviour of players and the media.Arguably the report marked a watershed in the game, creating a family and television-friendly leisure activity with huge commercial potential out of the ruins of a hooliganised, male-dominated anachronism of a sport. As the chart shows, the decline in football violence and rising crowds have moved hand in hand.The stock market has been slow to catch on to the full implications of those changes, but a number of recent developments have switched it on to the lucrative potential of football. Most important of these has been the rising role of television and especially pay-per-view deals.Other developments have also had a large impact, however, including a growing appreciation of the role of merchandising, sponsorship and asset utilisation. In no other business would a company's major asset be used for only 90 minutes a week.That has changed and the market has rushed for a share of the action to the extent that a leading club like Manchester United is now valued at the best part of pounds 500m. But anyone tempted by the sparkling share price performances of companies like Celtic, Chelsea Village and Caspian (Leeds) over the past 12 months should tread carefully.Manchester United has a prosperous future because it has an instantly recognisable brand, more or less guaranteed income from television and the virtuous circle of success on the field leading to growing revenues.

Most clubs do not have that potential.The spiralling wage bills that will inevitably accompany such high potential profits will price all but a handful of clubs out of the financial premiership. Already, as the chart shows, they use up a large chunk of the lesser clubs' income.The fact remains that most clubs are not profitable and those that are not propped up by a wealthy benefactor are dependent on the goodwill of their bankers to keep them afloat. More than anywhere the riches of football will fall on the biggest pile and the ratings currently enjoyed by second- line clubs will prove unsustainable.. Peter Johnson, Park Food's executive chairman and 70 per cent shareholder, has had a bad year.